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FOREWORD
Louis Loss*
Forewords to symposia of this sort perform substantially the
same function - and are about as dispensable - as presentations
of dinner speakers who "need no introduction." At best they don't
hold up the program too long. And the worst is better left undescribed. One thing that can be said for them is that they afford an
opportunity to write without the heavy annotation that is the curse
of legal literature. To be sure, that is not altogether a boon: the
absence of cosmetics tends to bring out the warts. Even so, writing
without footnotes is almost as ideal as (one must remember the
time of year for a professor) teaching without examinations.
With the student writing programs increasingly in vogue, and
the recent tendency for law schools to publish multiple law reviews,
one who tries to follow all the literature in a burgeoning field for
fear of missing an occasional pearl of great price is sometimes
tempted to call down the wrath of the gods on the printing press
and all its works. The art form known as the symposium is apt
to be a particular offender; for every editor knows the risks of
inviting the submission even of isolated manuscripts, and anybody
who has tried to put together a balanced tennis foursome or string
quartet can only imagine the problem of achieving symmetry in a
scholarly symposium. The editors of this collection, therefore, are
to be congratulated the more warmly for coming up with three essays so timely, so complementary and, above all, so thoughtful.
I have no idea at this writing - since I have seen only the typescripts of the three articles - what order the editors will choose for
their printing. But to me they follow a dear line of march:
First of all, Professor Bromberg - to whom the Bar owes a debt
for his rationale of the peripatetic (dare one say "picaresque"?)
Rule 10b-5 - gives us an almost Hohfeldian "interest analysis" of
the tender offer (or take-over bid) from every conceivable point of
view. One ventures the guess that this will be for some time the
fons et origo. It reveals the writer's Yale motherhood at its best.
One should next read the piece by Mr. Sommer of the Cleveland
Bar, which is a practitioner's description of the Ohio statute - a
description that highlights with skillful advocacy not only a number
* The author is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Harvard University. B.S., University of Pennsylvania; LLB., Yale University.
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of troublesome interpretative problems but also the special interest
character of the legislation and its parochialism.
Finally, Professor Shipman, after comparing the Ohio statute
with the provisions added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
by the Williams Bill in 1968, concentrates incisively on the state
statute's novel extraterritorial coverage and the policy questions inherent in the idea of federal preemption.
It is no denigration of the contributions of the other two writers
to say that for me these last are the critical questions.
The cry of states' rights is not to be ignored, especially in the
field of securities regulation. If any reminder was needed, it came
with the SEC's failure to win elimination of the intrastate exemption
from broker-dealer registration in connection with the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964, even though there would have been no
more preemption than there is today with interstate broker-dealers which is to say, none at all.' Moreover, in view of the federal
vacuum that existed when the state blue sky laws began to make
their appearance in the years before World War I, as well as the
fact that the federal legislation is still limited by and large to the
disclosure philosophy, it is not easy to tell the states now to keep
off the federal preserve.2 And yet, if the "Balkanization" rhetoric
that one has heard with respect to the Ohio legislation does not
particularly advance the discourse, it is surely a simplistic view of
the universe that considers federal versus states' rights in the abstract. History has its claims. True, Congress was initially laggard
in the field of securities regulation. There might never have been
any blue sky laws if the period (1890-1914) that produced the antitrust laws had been a bit more fruitful with respect to corporate
controls generally. 3 On the other hand, Congress lost its shyness
almost forty years ago - and its child, the SEC, has seldom been
accused of suffering under that handicap.
Partly under the impact of the Uniform Securities Act, the emphasis in recent years has been on federal-state coordination. Indeed, presumably one of the major policy questions that will be
faced by the American Law Institute in its preparation of a Federal
Securities Code4 will be the extent to which the federal-state lines
' See 5 L. Loss, SEcuRIEs REGULATION 3357-58 (Supp. 1969).
2

See 1 id.at 102-05 (2d ed. 1961).
3 For a brief history of the federal incorporation movement, see 1 id., c. 1C.
4 See Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus.
LAw. 25 (1969).
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should be straightened in the process. , It also seems fair to suggest
that state legislation of the Ohio variety may be running against the
tide of the federal-state dichotomy that has been developing in
corporation law. The considerable amount of legislative reform at
the state level in recent years has been concerned primarily with the
internal ordering of the corporation. That is to say, the states seem
to be leaving to the world of the SEC those aspects of corporation
law (not really securities law) that are represented by the fiduciary
duties of corporations, their directors and other "insiders" to their
stockholders and the marketplace generally. This, of course, is the
"federal corporation law" to which courts and commentators have
been increasingly referring.
These considerations are enhanced when one considers the conflict-of-laws problems that Professor Shipman discusses and - even
more - the special interest aspects that are brought out by Mr.
Sommer. Even at the federal level, the Williams Bill leaves a
measure of philosophical disquiet as long as one result of full disclosure may be that, the better the reputation of the take-over bidder, the higher the price he will have to pay. 5 We do, after all,
pretend to a corporate system in which "[It]he incumbent management has no protected interest in remaining in power."6 And we
have been reminded to keep on guard lest we "frustrate the reallocation of productive resources from less profitable to potentially more
profitable uses."7 So even the federal intervention gives pause.
But, by contrast, the Ohio statute is shockingly one-sided, with all
the onus on the take-over bidder and none on the management of
the target company.
One is reminded of the "anti-strike-suit" legislation on security
for costs that started in New York in 1944. Both are species of
class legislation - the Ohio statute in the sense that it is franldy
management-protectionist and the New York statute in the sense
that it frustrates only the small stockholder. Moreover, both have
managed to throw the baby out with the bath by simply putting the
quietus on those take-over bids or derivative actions to which they
extend.
Perhaps it is not too much to hope that the state legislation on
5 See 6 L Loss, supra note 1, at 3665-66.
6
General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400, 403
(S.D.N.Y.), afd sub oam. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159
(2d Cir. 1968).
7
Taussig & Hayes, Are Cash Take-Over Bids Unethical?, 23 FIN. ANALYSTS J.107,
111 (Jan.-Feb. 1967).

612

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21: 609

take-over bids may have the same denouement. The drive for legislation of the New York variety spent its force soon after spreading to a handful of other states. Whether additional states will
follow Ohio and the milder but still pro-management legislation in
Nevada and Virginia8 will presumably depend not only on the experience in those states but also on what eventuates by way of
amendment at the federal level. Beyond that, there is always the
possibility that, altogether apart from the impact of regulation, the
growth of take-overs and conglomerates may come to be thought
of as an economic phenomenon of the sixties.
Meanwhile, let us by all means join the ghost of Brandeis in
watching the results of these three experiments. But let us also
recognize that, if three laboratories are good, thirty are not necessarily better.
8

See Ch. 97, §§ 2-20, [1969] Nev. Acts 120-25; Comment, Take-Over Bids in Virginia, 26 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 323 (1969).

